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CCP Response to the consultation on the Online Harms White Paper 
 
1. We welcome the opportunity to respond to the proposals of Her Majesty’s 
Government as outlined in the Online Harms White Paper. The Government should 
be commended for attempting to coherently tackle a large number of the very 
complex challenges that have come with the expansion of the internet and 
pervasiveness of online services in our lives. The White Paper is comprehensive in its 
identification of harms and ambitious in its approach. This carries with it some 
serious risks, most notably to freedom of expression and to UK innovation. In our 
response we aim to help the Government mitigate these risks should it take these 
proposals forward.  
 
2.  Before addressing the questions posed, we must address two underlying issues with 
the harms in scope. The first of these is the conflation of illegal and legal content or 
behaviour. We urge the Government to maintain a clear distinction between illegal 
behaviour resulting in harm and legal behaviour resulting in ham both in the 
language it uses and in its approach. With illegal activity, such as the distribution of 
CSEA imagery, sale of illegal weapons, or incitement to violence, the aim of online 
policy should be to help prevent such activity and to put in place reliable, 
accountable mechanisms for online services to co-operate with law enforcement in 
the proper investigation and prosecution of such crimes, with due process. When 
legal content or activity is in question, there is a real danger in placing responsibility 
on private companies to determine what is harmful, especially if the incentives are 
stacked towards caution by significant penalties and personal liability, as well as the 
existing pressure from users and advertisers. The risks to freedom of expression must 
also be acknowledged as potential harms. The aim of policy should be to guide the 
balancing of rights and interests, and to ensure the transparency and accountability 
of the measures taken.  
 
3.  The second issue is that, while it makes sense to focus only on harms to individuals, 
those affecting organisations, such as companies or civil society groups, are 
sometimes closely linked to harm to individuals.  As the White Paper points out, 
advertising plays a crucial role in the digital economy. The business models based on 
the gathering and selling of user data, monetizing user generated content, and ever 
more precise personalisation are enabling mechanisms behind many of the harms 
the White Paper attempts to address. The lack of transparency in finance and data 
flows, concentration within the ecosystem, barriers to entry due to the tipping 
effects of data acquisition, and other competition issues may seem to be ones that 
affect organisations rather than individuals, but line is actually quite blurry. Dealing 
with structural and ‘organisation’ problems may be more effective ways to reduce 
harms to individuals than trying to police content, especially legal content.  
 
4.  Because there of the link between structural issues and individual harms, as an 
overall suggestion, we recommend the government foresee and make explicit much 
greater coordination with the Competition and Market Authority (CMA) and the 
Information Commissioner’s Office than is currently discussed in the White Paper. 
Enabling data portability, greater competition, and user choice, while instituting 
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transparency in financial and data practices so that regulators and users can 
effectively monitor providers may reduce the need for penalising companies for their 
moderation of content and user activity. If a new regulator is established or Ofcom’s 
powers are extended, harmonisation will be needed to avoid further fragmentation 
of the regulatory landscape. A complex and fragmented regulatory landscape can 
make it difficult for companies, especially smaller ones, to be compliant and may 
amount to a barrier for new entrants into the market. 
 
 
Question 1: Beyond the measures set out in this White Paper, should the government do 
more to build a culture of transparency, trust and accountability across industry and, if so, 
what? 
 
5.  Creating greater transparency and accountability to users is arguably more 
important for encouraging companies offering online services to prevent harms than 
fines or other punitive measures, and the White Paper is right to emphasise this aim. 
Point 3.20 is crucial as the ability to require information from companies on an ad 
hoc basis in relation to particular areas of concern is a valuable regulatory power, 
especially in industries known for opacity. However, this should not be limited to the 
measures being taken to prevent harm or sharing in-house or commissioned 
research as is described in the White Paper. In order to also address the structural 
issues mentioned above, and to assess certain measures, transparency in the money 
flows, data flows and probably algorithm designs will also be necessary.  
 
6. For example, one of the measures that YouTube takes against users posting content 
that might not be illegal, but may be inflammatory or extremist, is to disable their 
monetization. Assessing the effectiveness and proportionality of such measures 
would require information about the advertising income lost to the platform and 
perhaps whether certain advertisers have been associated with certain kinds of 
problematic content.1 One of the objectives of greater transparency is to provide 
citizens information to help them make choices about their use of services, perhaps 
to ones with greater protections or to ones that are more libertarian. For this they 
must have choices. Therefore transparency is also needed in order to identify 
conditions that might generate barriers to entry to alternative services. This is an 
area where close collaboration with the CMA and the ICO, as mentioned above, 
should be encouraged. In both cases default transparency of the advertising trade 
and other information related to the monetization of content would be needed. The 
French Sapin Law, which requires transparency in the advertising industry is a good 
model for some aspects of what is required, although, some practical details are yet 
to be fine-tuned via decree.2  
 
                                                          
1 The EU Code of Practice on Disinformation has been signed by the major associations of the advertising 
industry representing advertisers and media agencies as well as the online services companies because they 
also are crucial to efforts to disincentivise such content.  
2 For a discussion of this law as a model see Broughton Micova, S. and Jacques, S. (2019) The Playing 
Field in Audiovisual Advertising. Centre on Regulation in Europe, available at: 
https://cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/cerre_playingfieldaudiovisualadvertising_2019april.pdf 
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Question 2: Should designated bodies be able to bring ‘super complaints’ to the regulator in 
specific and clearly evidenced circumstances? 
 
7.  The complaints-based model for dealing with content is a good one that has a long 
history in both press self-regulation and broadcasting regulation. The White Paper 
suggests ‘designated bodies’ might be allowed to bring ‘super complaints’ to a 
regulator if they are not satisfied with the redress mechanisms of an online service 
provider. Maintaining the necessary distinction between illegal and legal content and 
activity, we assume here that this ‘super complaints’ mechanism would apply to 
complaints about legal content or activity, and that relevant law enforcement 
agencies would be the appropriate place for those related to illegal content or 
activity.  
 
8.  It is useful in this context to refer back to the recommendations made by the Leveson 
inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press for the regulation of the UK 
Press.3  Though they were meant to apply to a self-regulatory body, they are relevant 
also to the second instance mechanism described in the White Paper as ‘super 
complaints’. Leveson was clear that complaints could be made by anyone, including 
third parties on behalf of individuals or groups. Not only ‘designated bodies’, but 
other groups of individuals or groups representing individuals should be able to raise 
complaints. These could be, for example, a disability charity in relation to disablist 
content, or an informal group of female gamers who are unsatisfied with a service’s 
response to sexist and harassing comments on their game videos. The policy aim 
here must be enabling free expression, with the understanding that some 
individuals’ expression is being stifled in the current environment by the legal yet 
vicious and harmful speech of others. Such a mechanism must be equally open to 
those who feel their speech or activity online has been overly restricted in the name 
of protecting others from harm.  
 
9.  The White Paper rightly does not envision this ‘super complaints’ mechanism as 
playing the role of resolving disputes between individuals and online services. This 
mechanism should be for identifying systemic failures in the moderation of the 
services or discriminatory practices. The requirement, however, should not be 
‘evidenced circumstances’ as stated in the White Paper, but instead it should be the 
collective nature of the harm. Evidence can be difficult to gather for those without 
regulatory powers (complainants) because of the nature of online companies. The 
specific and collective nature of the circumstance should be the criteria and then the 
investigation by a regulator that has the power to command the necessary data 
should generate the evidence. Only in this way can persistent discrimination, over-
restriction of expression, or ineffectiveness in enabling the speech of marginalized 
groups be identified.  
 
                                                          
3 See the Report of the Inquiry published 29 November, 2012 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/leveson-inquiry-report-into-the-culture-practices-
and-ethics-of-the-press 
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Question 4: What role should Parliament play in scrutinising the work of the regulator, 
including the development of codes of practice? 
 
10.  Parliament should scrutinize the work of the regulator proposed no more than it 
currently does the work of Ofcom, and neither Parliament nor Government should 
have any role in the development of codes of practices. The development of codes 
of practice should be multistakeholder processes that include industry, civil society, 
academics, and any relevant public institutions.  
 
Question 5: Are proposals for the online platforms and services in scope of the regulatory 
framework a suitable basis for an effective and proportionate approach? 
 
11.  The all-encompassing scope of the White Paper is problematic and this is largely due 
to its conflation of illegal and legal content and activities. While illegal activity or 
content such as the sharing of CSEA content or the organisation of terrorism would 
need to be covered by a wide-reaching scope, the scope should not be so wide for 
dealing with legal content and activity. Size and reach should matter. One of the 
reasons broadcasting content is regulated is because of its reach. The number of 
users is a useful measure of reach, so a threshold should be set such as the one set 
out in the German NetzDG law.4 User should be defined so as not to mean simply 
one-off visitors to a site, but those who have agreed to the terms and conditions of 
a service and regularly make use of it. For a service to be deemed above the threshold 
their user numbers should be above the threshold for a designated period of time.  
 
12.  We have concerns as to the compliance of the proposed actions with the E-
commerce Directive. Although the White Paper confirms its compatibility with the 
Directive in paragraph 41, the solutions proposed in section 6.16 amount to targeted 
unlimited filtering which was specifically rejected as incompatible by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in the Netlog case.5  
 
 
Question 8: What further steps could be taken to ensure the regulator will act in a targeted 
and proportionate manner?  
 
13.  The first step would be to give it a clear mandate and powers which, as discussed 
above, would entail a more nuanced scope that distinguishes between illegal and 
legal content and activity. In defining the mandate and scope, the Government must 
be careful not to render illegal content that is currently legal without duly justifying 
why the online environment would merit making something illegal that is not illegal 
in the offline environment. For example, bullying is a harmful behaviour against 
which schools and workplaces undertake a variety of measures, but it is not illegal. 
While online services may be expected to undertake sufficient measures to prevent 
                                                          
4 This is the Network Enforcement Act (Netzdurchsetzunggesetz, NetzDG) adopted in September 2017, which 
can be found in English here https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=1245 
5 The ‘Netlog case’, SABAM v. Netlog NV (C‑360/10) dealt with measures for enforcing copyright including the 
type of measure and potential consequences of its use.  
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and deal with bullying behaviour online, the powers given to the regulator should 
not effectively render that behaviour illegal.  
 
14. Another step would be to ensure the regulator is accountable to the public. This 
could include a requirement that impact assessments be conducted before the 
imposition of some enforcement measures, which might include modelling, and 
should include the retention of judicial review as an option for companies, 
organisations and individuals affected by the regulator’s decisions.  
 
15.  The White Paper seems to intend a push towards technical solutions with some kind 
of human review of the outcomes of these solutions. Another aspect of ensuring 
proportionality would be to clearly designate who will bear the costs of developing 
these solutions, testing these in any impact assessment phase, and maintaining 
them. The White Paper includes some measures to support SMEs, however, the 
Government should make clear the long-term arrangements, including thresholds at 
which any potential new entrant is no longer considered an SME for the purposes of 
any assistance or the imposition of costs related to compliance.  
 
 
Question 10: Should an online harms regulator be: (i) a new public body, or (ii) an existing 
public body? 
 
16.  A new public body is not necessary. The aims of the White Paper should be achieved 
by the expansion of the mandate and powers of Ofcom and coordination among 
other existing public bodies such as the CMA and the ICO. Our suggestion that Ofcom 
take on this role is not only about avoiding the additional expense and fragmentation 
that the creation of new public body might entail. Ofcom has a long history of dealing 
with content issues and monitoring the moderation of content by companies with 
editorial responsibility. Therefore the institutional culture will be attuned to the 
considerations that are involved in matters of balancing communication rights with 
other rights and public interests. Ofcom has the statutory duty to have at its heart 
the interests of individuals both as consumers, who merit protection, and citizens, 
who must be enabled to participate in society.  
 
Question 12: Should the regulator be empowered to i) disrupt business activities, or ii) 
undertake ISP blocking, or iii) implement a regime for senior management liability? What, if 
any, further powers should be available to the regulator? 
 
17.  The White Paper proposes some pretty extreme enforcement mechanisms, and all 
three of those listed in question 12 are ones that may be disproportionate for dealing 
with legal content and activity.  While there is evidence that there are harms that 
must be addressed, including that the expression of many individuals is being stifled 
by the behaviour of others, an overly powerful and interventionist regulatory regime 
can also be dangerous. If the powers listed in question 12 are to be part of the 
repertoire of the regulator, they should be reserved for highly limited circumstances 
and there must checks on their use such as appeal, judicial review, and public 
reporting requirements. 
7 
 
 
18. The most important power of the regulator will be to require information and 
transparency reporting, and emphasis should be placed on these tools for enabling 
accountability to the public. Incentives for online service providers to deal effectively 
with legal content and activity that might be harmful already exist in the form of 
advertisers’ interest in appearing with ‘brand safe’ content and  users’ desire to have 
a good user experience. Where content or activity crosses the line into hate speech 
or incitement, the UK already has legislation that provide penalties for stirring up 
hatred6. Where content or activity amounts to the distribution of CSEA or inciting 
terrorism other laws apply.  
 
19.  An additional measure that the Government should consider is the conduct of 
regular or ad hoc audits of the systems that online services have in place, or requiring 
that external audits be conducted, in a similar manner to the practice in the financial 
sector. These would be complementary to the transparency reporting and focus on 
evaluating the outcome of the controls the online services have instituted, such as 
flagging and take down or algorithmic filtering. Another potential measure is 
requiring services to allocate a certain percentage of revenue to funds aimed at 
supporting initiatives to help counter the alleged harms, such as anti-bullying 
programmes, support for victims of harassment, fact checkers, or investigative 
journalism. Such measures should only apply to services over a certain threshold in 
order to ensure proportionality and avoid erecting barriers to entry.  
 
20.  It remains of the utmost importance that the potential harm to freedom of 
expression be properly included in any criteria for assessing compliance and 
effectiveness. Measuring effectiveness solely in the speed and rate of take downs is 
not sufficient. Any audit or monitoring of systems for preventing harm must also be 
able to identify any discrimination or if the speech of some is being overly restricted.  
 
                                                          
6 Section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986 as amended by the 2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act and the 2008 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
